package blockmode

import (
	"crypto/cipher"
	"encoding/binary"

	"xdx.jelly/xgcl/gerrors"
	"xdx.jelly/xgcl/internal/subtle"
	"xdx.jelly/xgcl/internal/xor"
)

// NewGCM 返回AEAD接口，使用标准的12字节的nonce和16字节的tag。并且BlockEncrypter.BlockSize()
// 必须返回16。
func NewGCM(cipher EcbBlockMode) (TernaryGCM, error) {
	aead, err := NewGCMWithNonceAndTagSize(cipher, gcmStandardNonceSize, gcmTagSize)
	return aead, err
}

// gcmFieldElement represents a value in GF(2¹²⁸). In order to reflect the GCM
// standard and make binary.BigEndian suitable for marshaling these values, the
// bits are stored in big endian order. For example:
//
//	the coefficient of x⁰ can be obtained by v.low >> 63.
//	the coefficient of x⁶³ can be obtained by v.low & 1.
//	the coefficient of x⁶⁴ can be obtained by v.high >> 63.
//	the coefficient of x¹²⁷ can be obtained by v.high & 1.
type gcmFieldElement struct {
	low, high uint64
}

// gcm represents a Galois Counter Mode with a specific key. See
// https://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf
type gcm struct {
	cipher    EcbBlockMode
	nonceSize int
	tagSize   int
	// productTable contains the first sixteen powers of the key, H.
	// However, they are in bit reversed order. See NewGCMWithNonceSize.
	productTable [16]gcmFieldElement

	y                 gcmFieldElement
	additionalDataLen int
	dataLen           int
	tagMask           [gcmBlockSize]byte
	counter           [gcmBlockSize]byte
	buf               []byte // 上一个分组未处理的数据。
}

// NewGCMWithNonceSize returns the given 128-bit, block cipher wrapped in Galois
// Counter Mode, which accepts nonces of the given length. The length must not
// be zero.
//
// Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing
// cryptosystem that uses non-standard nonce lengths. All other users should use
// NewGCM, which is faster and more resistant to misuse.
func NewGCMWithNonceSize(cipher EcbBlockMode, size int) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
	return NewGCMWithNonceAndTagSize(cipher, size, gcmTagSize)
}

// NewGCMWithTagSize returns the given 128-bit, block cipher wrapped in Galois
// Counter Mode, which generates tags with the given length.
//
// Tag sizes between 12 and 16 bytes are allowed.
//
// Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing
// cryptosystem that uses non-standard tag lengths. All other users should use
// NewGCM, which is more resistant to misuse.
func NewGCMWithTagSize(cipher EcbBlockMode, tagSize int) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
	return NewGCMWithNonceAndTagSize(cipher, gcmStandardNonceSize, tagSize)
}

func NewGCMWithNonceAndTagSize(cipher EcbBlockMode, nonceSize, tagSize int) (TernaryGCM, error) {
	if tagSize < gcmMinimumTagSize || tagSize > gcmBlockSize {
		return nil, gerrors.WithAnnotatingf(ErrInvalidInput, "tag size in GCM can only between %d and %d", gcmMinimumTagSize, gcmBlockSize)
	}

	if nonceSize <= 0 {
		return nil, gerrors.WithAnnotating(ErrInvalidInput, "the nonce can't have zero length, or the security of the key will be immediately compromised")
	}

	if cipher.BlockSize() != gcmBlockSize {
		return nil, gerrors.WithAnnotating(ErrInvalidInput, "blockmode: NewGCM requires 128-bit block cipher")
	}

	var key [gcmBlockSize]byte
	_ = cipher.EcbEncCryptBlocks(key[:], key[:])

	g := &gcm{cipher: cipher, nonceSize: nonceSize, tagSize: tagSize, buf: make([]byte, 0, gcmBlockSize)}

	// We precompute 16 multiples of |key|. However, when we do lookups
	// into this table we'll be using bits from a field element and
	// therefore the bits will be in the reverse order. So normally one
	// would expect, say, 4*key to be in index 4 of the table but due to
	// this bit ordering it will actually be in index 0010 (base 2) = 2.
	x := gcmFieldElement{
		binary.BigEndian.Uint64(key[:8]),
		binary.BigEndian.Uint64(key[8:]),
	}
	g.productTable[reverseBits(1)] = x

	for i := 2; i < 16; i += 2 {
		g.productTable[reverseBits(i)] = gcmDouble(&g.productTable[reverseBits(i/2)])
		g.productTable[reverseBits(i+1)] = gcmAdd(&g.productTable[reverseBits(i)], &x)
	}

	return g, nil
}

const (
	gcmBlockSize         = 16
	gcmTagSize           = 16
	gcmMinimumTagSize    = 12 // NIST SP 800-38D recommends tags with 12 or more bytes.
	gcmStandardNonceSize = 12
)

func (g *gcm) NonceSize() int {
	return g.nonceSize
}

func (g *gcm) Overhead() int {
	return g.tagSize
}

// Seal 加密，输入nonce大小必须为g.NonceSize().
func (g *gcm) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
		panic("blockmode: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
	}
	if uint64(len(plaintext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(g.cipher.BlockSize()) {
		panic("blockmode: message too large for GCM")
	}

	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+g.tagSize)
	if subtle.InexactOverlap(out, plaintext) {
		// 拷贝一份原文
		plaintext = dup(plaintext)
	}

	var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
	g.deriveCounter(&counter, nonce) // counter = J0

	_ = g.cipher.EcbEncCryptBlocks(tagMask[:], counter[:])
	gcmInc32(&counter)

	g.counterCrypt(out, plaintext, &counter)

	var tag [gcmTagSize]byte
	g.auth(tag[:], out[:len(plaintext)], additionalData, &tagMask)
	copy(out[len(plaintext):], tag[:])

	return ret
}

func (g *gcm) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
		return dst, gerrors.WithAnnotatingf(ErrAEADOpenFailed, "incorrect nonce length(%d) given to GCM, it should be %d", len(nonce), g.nonceSize)
	}
	// Sanity check to prevent the authentication from always succeeding if an implementation
	// leaves tagSize uninitialized, for example.
	if g.tagSize < gcmMinimumTagSize {
		return dst, gerrors.WithAnnotatingf(ErrAEADOpenFailed, "input tag size(%d) too small, it should be at least %d", g.tagSize, gcmMinimumTagSize)
	}

	if len(ciphertext) < g.tagSize {
		return dst, gerrors.WithAnnotating(ErrAEADOpenFailed, "ciphertext is shorter than tag size")
	}
	if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(g.cipher.BlockSize())+uint64(g.tagSize) {
		return dst, gerrors.WithAnnotatingf(ErrAEADOpenFailed, "ciphertext too long")
	}

	tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize:]
	ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize]

	var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
	g.deriveCounter(&counter, nonce)

	_ = g.cipher.EcbEncCryptBlocks(tagMask[:], counter[:])
	gcmInc32(&counter)

	var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte
	g.auth(expectedTag[:], ciphertext, additionalData, &tagMask)

	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
	if subtle.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
		ciphertext = dup(ciphertext)
	}

	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:g.tagSize], tag) != 1 {
		// The AESNI code decrypts and authenticates concurrently, and
		// so overwrites dst in the event of a tag mismatch. That
		// behavior is mimicked here in order to be consistent across
		// platforms.
		for i := range out {
			out[i] = 0
		}
		return ret[:len(dst)], gerrors.ChainErrors(ErrAEADOpenFailed, ErrAEADTagCheckFailed)
	}
	g.counterCrypt(out, ciphertext, &counter)
	return ret, nil
}

// reverseBits reverses the order of the bits of 4-bit number in i.
func reverseBits(i int) int {
	i = ((i << 2) & 0xc) | ((i >> 2) & 0x3)
	i = ((i << 1) & 0xa) | ((i >> 1) & 0x5)
	return i
}

// gcmAdd adds two elements of GF(2¹²⁸) and returns the sum.
func gcmAdd(x, y *gcmFieldElement) gcmFieldElement {
	// Addition in a characteristic 2 field is just XOR.
	return gcmFieldElement{x.low ^ y.low, x.high ^ y.high}
}

// gcmDouble returns the result of doubling an element of GF(2¹²⁸).
func gcmDouble(x *gcmFieldElement) (double gcmFieldElement) {
	msbSet := x.high&1 == 1

	// Because of the bit-ordering, doubling is actually a right shift.
	double.high = x.high >> 1
	double.high |= x.low << 63
	double.low = x.low >> 1

	// If the most-significant bit was set before shifting then it,
	// conceptually, becomes a term of x^128. This is greater than the
	// irreducible polynomial so the result has to be reduced. The
	// irreducible polynomial is 1+x+x^2+x^7+x^128. We can subtract that to
	// eliminate the term at x^128 which also means subtracting the other
	// four terms. In characteristic 2 fields, subtraction == addition ==
	// XOR.
	if msbSet {
		double.low ^= 0xe100000000000000
	}

	return
}

var gcmReductionTable = []uint16{
	0x0000, 0x1c20, 0x3840, 0x2460, 0x7080, 0x6ca0, 0x48c0, 0x54e0,
	0xe100, 0xfd20, 0xd940, 0xc560, 0x9180, 0x8da0, 0xa9c0, 0xb5e0,
}

// mul sets y to y*H, where H is the GCM key, fixed during NewGCMWithNonceSize.
func (g *gcm) mul(y *gcmFieldElement) {
	var z gcmFieldElement

	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
		word := y.high
		if i == 1 {
			word = y.low
		}

		// Multiplication works by multiplying z by 16 and adding in
		// one of the precomputed multiples of H.
		for j := 0; j < 64; j += 4 {
			msw := z.high & 0xf
			z.high >>= 4
			z.high |= z.low << 60
			z.low >>= 4
			z.low ^= uint64(gcmReductionTable[msw]) << 48

			// the values in |table| are ordered for
			// little-endian bit positions. See the comment
			// in NewGCMWithNonceSize.
			t := &g.productTable[word&0xf]

			z.low ^= t.low
			z.high ^= t.high
			word >>= 4
		}
	}

	*y = z
}

// updateBlocks extends y with more polynomial terms from blocks, based on
// Horner's rule. There must be a multiple of gcmBlockSize bytes in blocks.
func (g *gcm) updateBlocks(y *gcmFieldElement, blocks []byte) {
	for len(blocks) > 0 {
		y.low ^= binary.BigEndian.Uint64(blocks)
		y.high ^= binary.BigEndian.Uint64(blocks[8:])
		g.mul(y)
		blocks = blocks[gcmBlockSize:]
	}
}

// update extends y with more polynomial terms from data. If data is not a
// multiple of gcmBlockSize bytes long then the remainder is zero padded.
func (g *gcm) update(y *gcmFieldElement, data []byte) {
	fullBlocks := (len(data) >> 4) << 4
	g.updateBlocks(y, data[:fullBlocks])

	if len(data) != fullBlocks {
		var partialBlock [gcmBlockSize]byte
		copy(partialBlock[:], data[fullBlocks:])
		g.updateBlocks(y, partialBlock[:])
	}
}

// gcmInc32 treats the final four bytes of counterBlock as a big-endian value
// and increments it.
func gcmInc32(counterBlock *[16]byte) {
	ctr := counterBlock[len(counterBlock)-4:]
	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ctr, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(ctr)+1)
}

// sliceForAppend takes a slice and a requested number of bytes. It returns a
// slice with the contents of the given slice followed by that many bytes and a
// second slice that aliases into it and contains only the extra bytes. If the
// original slice has sufficient capacity then no allocation is performed.
func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) {
	if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total {
		head = in[:total]
	} else {
		head = make([]byte, total)
		copy(head, in)
	}
	tail = head[len(in):]
	return
}

// counterCrypt crypts in to out using g.cipher in counter mode.
func (g *gcm) counterCrypt(out, in []byte, counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte) {
	// var mask [gcmBlockSize]byte
	counterBuf := make([]byte, (len(in)+gcmBlockSize-1)&(^(gcmBlockSize - 1)))
	for i := 0; i < len(counterBuf); i += gcmBlockSize {
		copy(counterBuf[i:i+gcmBlockSize], counter[:])
		gcmInc32(counter)
	}
	_ = g.cipher.EcbEncCryptBlocks(counterBuf, counterBuf)
	xor.XorBytes(out, in, counterBuf)
}

// deriveCounter computes the initial GCM counter state from the given nonce.
// See NIST SP 800-38D, section 7.1. This assumes that counter is filled with
// zeros on entry.
func (g *gcm) deriveCounter(counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte, nonce []byte) {
	// GCM has two modes of operation with respect to the initial counter
	// state: a "fast path" for 96-bit (12-byte) nonces, and a "slow path"
	// for nonces of other lengths. For a 96-bit nonce, the nonce, along
	// with a four-byte big-endian counter starting at one, is used
	// directly as the starting counter. For other nonce sizes, the counter
	// is computed by passing it through the GHASH function.
	if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize {
		copy(counter[:], nonce)
		counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1
		counter[gcmBlockSize-2] = 0
		counter[gcmBlockSize-3] = 0
		counter[gcmBlockSize-4] = 0
	} else {
		var y gcmFieldElement
		g.update(&y, nonce)
		y.high ^= uint64(len(nonce)) * 8
		g.mul(&y)
		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(counter[:8], y.low)
		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(counter[8:], y.high)
	}
}

// auth calculates GHASH(ciphertext, additionalData), masks the result with
// tagMask and writes the result to out.
func (g *gcm) auth(out, ciphertext, additionalData []byte, tagMask *[gcmTagSize]byte) {
	var y gcmFieldElement
	g.update(&y, additionalData)
	g.update(&y, ciphertext)

	y.low ^= uint64(len(additionalData)) * 8
	y.high ^= uint64(len(ciphertext)) * 8

	g.mul(&y)

	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out, y.low)
	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[8:], y.high)

	xor.XorBytes(out, out, tagMask[:])
}

func (g *gcm) init(nonce []byte) error {
	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
		return gerrors.WithAnnotatingf(ErrInvalidInput, "incorrect nonce length given to GCM, want %d, given %d", g.nonceSize, len(nonce))
	}
	g.deriveCounter(&g.counter, nonce)

	return nil
}
func (g *gcm) SpecifyADD(ad []byte) {

	g.additionalDataLen = len(ad)
	g.dataLen = 0
	g.y.high = 0
	g.y.low = 0
	g.buf = g.buf[:0]
	g.update(&g.y, ad)

	_ = g.cipher.EcbEncCryptBlocks(g.tagMask[:], g.counter[:])
	gcmInc32(&g.counter)
}

// EncryptInit 三段式加密第一步, Seal/Open/Update/
func (g *gcm) EncryptInit(nonce []byte) error {
	return g.init(nonce)
}

func (g *gcm) Encrypt(dst []byte, in []byte) ([]byte, error) {
	dst, err := g.EncryptUpdate(dst, in)
	if err != nil {
		return dst, err
	}
	return g.EncryptFinal(dst)
}

// encryptCounters returns the ciphertext of counter || counter+1 || ... || counter+n-1
func (g *gcm) encryptCounters(n int) ([]byte, error) {
	var oldCounter [gcmBlockSize]byte
	copy(oldCounter[:], g.counter[:])

	counterBuf := make([]byte, n*gcmBlockSize)
	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
		copy(counterBuf[i*gcmBlockSize:(i+1)*gcmBlockSize], g.counter[:])
		gcmInc32(&g.counter)
	}
	if err := g.cipher.EcbEncCryptBlocks(counterBuf, counterBuf); err != nil {
		copy(g.counter[:], oldCounter[:])
		return nil, gerrors.WithMessage(err, "EcbEncCryptBlocks failed")
	}
	return counterBuf, nil
}

func (g *gcm) EncryptUpdate(dst []byte, in []byte) ([]byte, error) {
	g.dataLen += len(in)
	if len(g.buf)+len(in) < gcmBlockSize {
		g.buf = append(g.buf, in...)
		return dst, nil
	}

	nBlocks := (len(g.buf) + len(in)) >> 4
	counterBuf, err := g.encryptCounters(nBlocks)
	if err != nil {
		return dst, err
	}

	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, nBlocks*gcmBlockSize)
	xor.XorBytes(out, counterBuf, g.buf)
	counterBuf = counterBuf[len(g.buf):]
	out = out[len(g.buf):]
	n := xor.XorBytes(out, counterBuf, in)
	in = in[n:]
	g.buf = append(g.buf[:0], in...)
	g.update(&g.y, ret[len(dst):])
	return ret, nil
}

func (g *gcm) EncryptFinal(dst []byte) ([]byte, error) {
	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(g.buf)+gcmTagSize)
	tag := out[len(g.buf):]
	out = out[:len(g.buf)]
	if len(g.buf) > 0 {
		counterBuf := make([]byte, gcmBlockSize)
		_ = g.cipher.EcbEncCryptBlocks(counterBuf, g.counter[:])
		xor.XorBytes(out, counterBuf, g.buf)
		g.update(&g.y, out)
	}

	g.y.low ^= uint64(g.additionalDataLen) * 8
	g.y.high ^= uint64(g.dataLen) * 8
	g.mul(&g.y)
	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(tag, g.y.low)
	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(tag[8:], g.y.high)

	xor.XorBytes(tag, tag, g.tagMask[:])
	return ret, nil
}

// EncryptInit 三段式加密第一步, Seal/Open/Update/
func (g *gcm) DecryptInit(nonce []byte) error {
	return g.init(nonce)
}

func (g *gcm) Decrypt(dst []byte, in []byte) ([]byte, error) {
	dst, err := g.DecryptUpdate(dst, in)
	if err != nil {
		return dst, err
	}
	return g.DecryptFinal(dst)
}

func (g *gcm) DecryptUpdate(dst []byte, in []byte) ([]byte, error) {
	if g.tagSize < gcmMinimumTagSize {
		return dst, gerrors.WithAnnotatingf(ErrGCMDecFailed, "incorrect GCM tag size(%d)", g.tagSize)
	}

	// if len(ciphertext) < g.tagSize {
	// 	return nil, errOpen
	// }
	// if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(g.cipher.BlockSize())+uint64(g.tagSize) {
	// 	return nil, errOpen
	// }
	if len(g.buf)+len(in) < 2*gcmBlockSize {
		g.buf = append(g.buf, in...)
		g.dataLen += len(in)
		return dst, nil
	}

	// at least one block
	processDataLen := len(g.buf) + len(in) - gcmBlockSize
	nBlocks := processDataLen >> 4
	nCounterCipher, err := g.encryptCounters(nBlocks)
	if err != nil {
		return dst, gerrors.ChainErrors(ErrGCMDecFailed, err)
	}

	g.dataLen += len(in)
	n := 2*gcmBlockSize - len(g.buf)
	g.buf = append(g.buf, in[:n]...)
	in = in[n:]

	if len(in) < gcmBlockSize {
		// 处理1个block并返回
		g.update(&g.y, g.buf[:gcmBlockSize])
		xor.XorBytes(nCounterCipher[:gcmBlockSize], nCounterCipher[:gcmBlockSize], g.buf[:gcmBlockSize])
		dst = append(dst, nCounterCipher[:gcmBlockSize]...)
		n := copy(g.buf[:gcmBlockSize], g.buf[gcmBlockSize:])
		g.buf = g.buf[:n]
		g.buf = append(g.buf, in...)
		return dst, nil
	}
	// 先处理g.buf的2个blocks
	g.update(&g.y, g.buf[:2*gcmBlockSize])
	xor.XorBytes(nCounterCipher[:2*gcmBlockSize], nCounterCipher[:2*gcmBlockSize], g.buf[:2*gcmBlockSize])
	dst = append(dst, nCounterCipher[:2*gcmBlockSize]...)
	g.buf = g.buf[:0]
	nCounterCipher = nCounterCipher[2*gcmBlockSize:]

	// 处理in剩余的nBlocks - 2个block
	g.update(&g.y, in[:(nBlocks-2)*gcmBlockSize])
	xor.XorBytes(nCounterCipher, nCounterCipher, in[:(nBlocks-2)*gcmBlockSize])
	dst = append(dst, nCounterCipher...)
	// 拷贝in剩余字节到buf，至少16字节。
	g.buf = append(g.buf[:0], in[(nBlocks-2)*gcmBlockSize:]...)

	return dst, nil
}

func (g *gcm) DecryptFinal(dst []byte) ([]byte, error) {
	// g.buf 至少应该16字节，即tag。否则输入错误或内部处理错误(bug)
	if g.dataLen < gcmTagSize {
		return dst, gerrors.WithAnnotating(ErrGCMDecFailed, "input data must at least 16 bytes long")
	}
	if len(g.buf) < gcmTagSize {
		return dst, gerrors.WithAnnotatingf(ErrGCMDecFailed, "internal error, len(g.buf)=%d", len(g.buf))
	}

	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(g.buf)-gcmTagSize)
	cipherText := g.buf[:len(g.buf)-gcmTagSize]
	WantedTag := g.buf[len(g.buf)-gcmTagSize:]

	if len(cipherText) > 0 {
		counterBuf := make([]byte, gcmBlockSize)
		_ = g.cipher.EcbEncCryptBlocks(counterBuf, g.counter[:])
		xor.XorBytes(out, counterBuf, cipherText)
		g.update(&g.y, out)
	}

	var tag [gcmTagSize]byte
	g.y.low ^= uint64(g.additionalDataLen) * 8
	g.y.high ^= uint64(g.dataLen) * 8
	g.mul(&g.y)
	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(tag[:8], g.y.low)
	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(tag[8:], g.y.high)

	xor.XorBytes(tag[:], tag[:], g.tagMask[:])
	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tag[:], WantedTag) != 0 {
		return dst, gerrors.ChainErrors(ErrGCMDecFailed, ErrAEADTagCheckFailed)
	}
	return ret, nil
}